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Delaware’s Ban on Fee-Shifting
A FAILED ATTEMPT TO PROTECT SHAREHOLDERS
AT THE EXPENSE OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
INTRODUCTION
When a U.S. company is deciding where to establish its
place of incorporation, Delaware is undoubtedly given serious
consideration. Known for its pro-business legislature and favorable
corporate laws, Delaware has attracted over one million companies
to incorporate within its borders—including 50% of all publicly
traded companies1 and 66% of Fortune 500 companies.2 After the
Delaware Legislature’s recent blunders, however, which incentivize
frivolous shareholder litigation and misconduct by plaintiffsattorneys, the once “business friendly” state might in fact be the
exact opposite, deterring companies from incorporating within its
borders and forcing them to take their business elsewhere.3
Effective August 1, 2015, the Delaware Legislature
enacted three amendments to Title 8 of the Delaware Code4 that
substantially affected what “stock companies” (or “publicly
traded companies”)5 incorporated in the state may include in
1 This number is based on data from the year 2013. About Agency, STATE OF
DEL., https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/9WEM-6PF3].
2 This number is based on data from the year 2015. JEFFREY W. BULLOCK,
DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), https://corp.delaware.
gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RUW-QQAG].
3 See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL 10, https://www.andrewskurth.com/assets/htmldocuments/15137_Proposed_
DGCL_Amendments_Rel_Docs_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ7N-SPFY] (recognizing this
risk by stating: “Those who have advanced that criticism have argued, and probably will
argue, that other states may take steps to accommodate fee-shifting charter and bylaw
provisions, and that businesses will therefore choose to incorporate in those other states,
rather than in Delaware. That is indeed a risk, but recognizing that risk refutes the very
criticism that the Council is acting out of self-interest.”).
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2017). Title 8 of the Delaware Code is referred to as
the “Delaware General Corporation Law” and is the governing doctrine of law over
Delaware corporations.
5 Stock Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A corporation
in which the capital is contributed by the shareholders and divided into shares . . . .”).
This note will primarily focus on “publicly traded companies,” which are a specific type of
stock corporation defined as “corporation[s] whose shares are traded to and among the
general public.” Public Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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their bylaws and articles of incorporation.6 The bylaws and the
articles of incorporation of a company lay the foundation for, and
are the driving forces behind, what the company and its
members can and cannot do. Generally speaking, the bylaws of a
company are its internal rules that regulate and govern the
“conduct of the business and the rights and liabilities of [its]
members.”7 The articles of incorporation (often referred to as the
“charter” or “certificate of incorporation”), on the other hand, is
mainly designed to disclose general information regarding the
company to the public and to its shareholders, such as “the
purpose or purposes for which the corporation is being organized,
the place of business . . . the number of directors, the names and
addresses of the directors for the first year, and the names and
addresses of the incorporators.”8
The Delaware Legislature’s three additions to the
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) included the
enactment of Sections 102(f)9 and 115,10 and the amendment of
Section 109(b).11 DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b) prohibit the
inclusion of “fee-shifting provisions” in the articles of incorporation
and bylaws, respectively, of any publicly traded company that is
incorporated in Delaware in regard to “internal corporate
claims.”12 Fee-shifting is “[t]he transfer of responsibility for paying
6 Joseph P. Boeckman & Ashley E. Graffeo, Delaware General Corporation Law
Amended Regarding Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Clauses, BAKERHOSTETLER (June
30, 2015), http://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/delaware-general-corporation-law-amendedregarding-fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-clauses [https://perma.cc/AU9S-QWJT].
7 By-Laws, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
8 Articles of Incorporation, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); see
generally DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102 (2017) (setting forth the requirements for a certificate
of incorporation).
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f) (“The certificate of incorporation may not
contain any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees
or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate
claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”).
10 Section 115 of the Delaware Code states:

The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent with
applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims
shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State,
and no provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit
bringing such claims in the courts of this State. “Internal corporate claims”
means claims, including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based
upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or
stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction
upon the Court of Chancery.
Id. § 115.

11 Id. § 109(b) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose
liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other
party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”).
12 See generally id. §§ 102(f), 109(b); see also Michael Greene, Delaware FeeShifting Bill Signed Into Law; Also Endorses Exclusive Forum Clauses, BLOOMBERG
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fees, esp[ecially] attorney’s fees, from the prevailing party to the
losing party” at the conclusion of litigation.13 The prohibition
applies to “internal corporate claim[s],” which, according to
DGCL Section 115,14 include, inter alia, shareholder derivative
suits,15 which will be the main focus of this note.16 Fee-shifting
can heavily impact litigation and a plaintiff’s decision to file suit
against a potential defendant, especially in regard to shareholder
derivative suits where the final attorneys’ fees generally range in
the hundreds of thousands of dollars,17 and even sometimes
(albeit rarely) in the hundreds of millions.18 Although fee-shifting
was once a useful deterrent to prevent frivolous litigation, now
that the Delaware Legislature has banned it, a Delaware
corporation’s last hope is to turn to DGCL Section 115, which,
unfortunately, will not be the safe haven it purports to be.
DGCL Section 115, which this note discusses only as a
failed mitigation tool for the implications imposed by Sections
102(f) and 109(b), permits the inclusion of a “forum-selection
clause”19 in the bylaws and articles of incorporation of any
company that is incorporated in Delaware with respect to
internal corporate claims, provided that the state of Delaware is
among those forums that the corporation selects in its forumselection clause.20
BNA (June 26, 2015), http://www.bna.com/delaware-feeshifting-bill-n17179928834 [https://
perma.cc/VDZ3-RSZ6] (providing a brief synopsis of the new amendments).
13 Fee-Shifting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (defining internal corporate claims as “claims,
including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a
duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity”).
15 Derivative Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A suit by a
beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to the fiduciary; esp[ecially], a
suit asserted by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf against a third party
(usu[ally] a corporate officer) because of the corporation’s failure to take some action
against the third party.”).
16 The term “internal corporate claims,” as defined by the Delaware Code
Section 115, can include any action, not just a derivative suit, based upon a breach of
fiduciary duty brought against a current or former director, officer, or stockholder. See
id. All other such actions are outside the scope of this note.
17 OLGA
KOUMRIAN,
CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH,
SETTLEMENTS
OF
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013
M&A LITIGATION 1, 3 (2014), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/7bd80347-1
24b-4b69-add5-575e33c3f61b/Settlements-of-M-and-A-Shareholder-Litigation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KTF6-K5HX] (“Plaintiff attorneys requested an average of $1.1 million in fees
for 2013 settlements . . . . Average plaintiff attorney fees requested in disclosure-only
settlements were $500,000 in 2013 . . . .”).
18 Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1219 (Del. 2012) (affirming
the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision to award plaintiff ’ s counsel more than $304
million in attorneys’ fees).
19 Forum-Selection Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A
contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the country,
state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.”).
20 See Greene, supra note 12.
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The Delaware Legislature enacted DGCL Section 102(f)
and amended DGCL Section 109(b) in direct response to the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v.
Deutscher Tennis Bund in 2014.21 In that case, the court upheld
a fee-shifting provision in the bylaws of a nonstock corporation22
as facially valid.23 Fearing a slippery slope and the possibility of
the court’s decision extending to publicly held corporations as
well,24 the Delaware House of Representatives unanimously
voted, along with two thirds of the Delaware Senate, to enact
DGCL Section 102(f) and amend Section 109(b).25 Now, publicly
traded corporations in Delaware are burdened with the negative
repercussions of the Delaware Legislature’s decision.
Part I of this note provides a history and overview of
shareholder derivative suits and explains the difference between
the American Rule’s and English Rule’s allocations of attorneys’
fees. This difference is notable due to DGCL Section 102(f)’s and
109(b)’s codification of the American Rule, which provides that
litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees,26 as opposed to the
English Rule, which provides that the unsuccessful litigant pays
the attorneys’ fees of the successful litigant.27 Part II discusses
the legislative history behind DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b),
including the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in ATP Tour.
Part III discusses the future repercussions of Sections 102(f) and
109(b) on shareholder derivative suits. Finally, Part IV discusses
the relationship between DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b) and
DGCL Section 115, and describes the most effective solution to
said repercussions.
Specifically, this note argues that the implementation of
DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b) will not protect shareholders,
21 S.B 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) (“Committee Findings:
The committee discussed the implications of the fee-shifting ban and heard testimony
explaining the reasoning behind the proposed updates. The proposed amendments would
prevent corporations from creating bylaws that impose liability for certain legal fees on
litigating shareholders. This statutory change was prompted by the Delaware Supreme
Court decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014),
which upheld a facially valid bylaw imposing such liability on shareholders.”).
22 Nonstock Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A
corporation that does not issue shares of stock as evidence of ownership but instead is
owned by its members in accordance with a charter or agreement.”).
23 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 555.
24 See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that “[t]he Council
believes that absent legislation, many Delaware corporations will eventually adopt
ATP-type provisions”).
25 Senate Bill 75: 148th General Assembly (2015–2016), DEL. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=24380 [https://perma.cc/JV4H-UVPC].
26 American Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The general
policy that all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fee.”).
27 English Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The requirement
that a losing litigant must pay the winner’s costs and attorney’s fees.”).

2017]

DELAWARE’S BAN ON FEE-SHIFTING

1343

contrary to the Delaware Legislature’s intentions, but instead
will incentivize frivolous shareholder litigation, which in turn
will have additional negative implications. These negative
implications include potential plaintiff-attorney misconduct, an
increase in mergers and acquisitions litigation, harm to
shareholders, and a decrease in the desirability of holding a
position on the board of directors or holding an officer position in
any publicly traded company that is incorporated in Delaware.
Furthermore, this note argues that the implementation of DGCL
Section 115, while perhaps having some mitigating effect on the
potential consequences of Sections 102(f) and 109(b), will not act
as a sufficient buffer between Sections 102(f) and 109(b) and
frivolous shareholder litigation. The proposed solution to the
aforementioned implications is one that recommends redrafts of
Sections 102(f) and 109(b), which will allow publicly traded
corporations to enact a fee-shifting provision in their certificates
of incorporation or bylaws, provided that such clause (1) allows
fee-shifting in both directions (i.e., two-way fee-shifting),28 and
(2) places a cap on the amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and
expenses for which an unsuccessful litigant would be liable to
the successful litigant in regard to shareholder derivative
actions. These procedural safeguards will not only deter frivolous
litigation and plaintiff-attorney misconduct, but will also give
some autonomy back to the corporation to decide what is best for
its shareholders.
I.

MECHANICS OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS AND
THE HISTORY OF FEE-SHIFTING

A.

Shareholder Derivative Suits and the Concept of FeeShifting

In order to fully comprehend the Delaware Legislature’s
new additions to Title 8 of the Delaware Code, one must
understand the scope of DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b). These
new sections apply only to claims that are considered “internal
corporate claims” as defined by DGCL Section 115,29 which
necessarily include shareholder derivative suits.30 The
shareholders of a corporation bring shareholder derivative suits,
28 Such a reformulation would be in contrast to the current Delaware General
Corporation Law Sections 102(f) and 109(b), which only prohibit one-way fee-shifting
clauses—specifically, those that shift the corporation’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and
expenses onto the stockholder. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (2017).
29 See id. §§ 102(f), 109(b) (prohibiting fee-shifting clauses in connection with
any “internal corporate claim[s]”).
30 Id.
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on behalf of the corporation, against the officers and directors of
that corporation for violations of fiduciary duties.31 In these
cases, since the plaintiff in the litigation is technically the
corporation, any damages recovered against the defendant-board
of directors or officers will go back into the corporation and not
directly to the shareholders themselves.32 As such, plaintiffshareholders generally will only receive an indirect benefit of the
corporation’s recovery.33 In addition to the detrimental financial
consequences for the defendant-board of directors and officers of
a corporation (who may be forced to pay excessive sums of money
to the corporation), the substantial attorneys’ fees awarded to
plaintiff-attorneys will be given at the expense of the corporation
and its shareholders.34 Moreover, shareholder derivative suits
often only result in intangible modifications to corporate
disclosure requirements35 or corporate governance;36 however, in
such situations, although the corporation and the plaintiffshareholders are not receiving any monetary benefit, the

31 See Derivative Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[A] suit
asserted by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf against a third party (usu[ally] a
corporate officer) because of the corporation’s failure to take some action against the
third party.”); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of
Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) (“In a derivative suit, the
corporation is the functional plaintiff—the real party in interest—and the allegations
are that the corporation’s current or former officers and directors breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporation.” (footnote omitted)).
32 Erickson, supra note 31, at 100 (“[A]ny recovery in a derivative suit is
returned to the corporation and even a substantial recovery for the corporation will
provide only a small pro rata indirect benefit to the shareholder.”).
33 Id.
34 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound
11–12 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econs., Research Paper No. 15-10, 2016) (“In sum,
shareholder litigation mainly serves as a means of transferring wealth from investors to
lawyers. At best, such suits take money out of the firm’s residual value—at the expense of
current shareholders—and return it to former shareholders, minus substantial legal fees.
In many cases, moreover, no money is returned to the shareholders or the corporate
entity, but legal fees are almost always paid.” (footnotes omitted)).
35 OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1, 5 (2014),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SK67-AVQD] (“Nearly 80 percent of settlements reached in 2014
provided only disclosure.”).
36 See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 11 n.71 (citing Jessica Erickson,
Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1749, 1798–99 (2010) (“reporting that settlements in 18 suits (42.9 percent)
included the payment of money or other financial consideration, as well as corporate
governance reforms. In another 17 suits (40.5 percent), the only consideration for the
settlement was corporate governance reforms.”)). Professor Erickson’s study further
reported, however, that “nearly 70 percent of the resolved cases . . . ended with an
involuntary or voluntary dismissal—resolutions that do not provide any significant
tangible benefit to the plaintiff corporations.” Erickson, supra, at 1794.
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attorneys still collect their fees37 under a “common benefit”
theory.38 Recent signs, however, show that these “disclosure
only” settlements are in fact coming to an end (as discussed
infra), leaving monetary settlements between parties as one of
the only options on the table.39
In order to combat the issues surrounding shareholder
derivative suits, corporations once had the ability to turn to
fee-shifting provisions. Fee-shifting, as used in this note, is the
allocation of responsibility for the payment of attorneys’ fees
from the successful party to the unsuccessful party.40 As such, a
fee-shifting provision in a company’s bylaws or certificate of
incorporation “impose[s] a ‘loser pays’ rule” that deviates from
the standard American Rule—which generally provides that
both parties pay their own legal expenses41—and instead
conforms with the English Rule—which provides that the “loser”
of the litigation pays the legal fees of the “winner.”42 Fee-shifting
under the English Rule is commonly executed by one of two
methods: “one-way” fee-shifting provisions or “two-way” feeshifting provisions.
One-way fee-shifting provisions dictate that “fees are to
be shifted in favor of only one party.”43 Put simply, a one-way
fee-shifting provision in a contract will provide for the allocation
of attorneys’ fees to the benefit of only one of the contracting
parties. For example, if company A and company B entered into
37 Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 11–12 (“In many cases, moreover, no money
is returned to the shareholders or the corporate entity, but legal fees are almost always
paid.”); see also KOUMRIAN, supra note 17, at 1, 3.
38 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991) (“Common benefit cases are typically shareholder’s
derivative suits in which the plaintiffs’ attorney does not generate a fund, but rather causes
the defendant to do something that confers a nonpecuniary benefit on the corporation . . . .
In common benefit and fee-shifting cases the attorneys’ fee comes from the defendant rather
than the class recovery.”).
39 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 887 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(holding that “the terms of th[e] proposed settlement are not fair or reasonable because none
of the supplemental disclosures were material or even helpful to Trulia’s stockholders, and
thus the proposed settlement does not afford them any meaningful consideration to warrant
providing a release of claims to the defendants”); Monica K. Loseman, An End to DisclosureOnly Settlements?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/06/an-end-to-disclosure-only-settlements/
[https://
perma.cc/47GM-FUXY] (detailing a 2015 Delaware Court of Chancery opinion in which the
Court signaled that disclosure-only settlements may be coming to an end).
40 Fee-Shifting, supra note 13.
41 Steven W. Lippman, A Corporation’s Securities Litigation Gambit: FeeShifting Provisions That Defend Against Fraud-on-the-Market, 49 U. RICH. L. REV.
1321, 1336 (2015); see also American Rule, supra note 26.
42 See English Rule, supra note 27.
43 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1589–90 (1993).
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a contract that included a one-way fee-shifting provision in favor
of A, in the event of litigation, if A were deemed the successful
litigant, A would be entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees from B.
On the other hand, if B were deemed to be the successful
litigant, B would not be able to recover its attorneys’ fees from A.
To the contrary, two-way fee-shifting provides for the
opposite, dictating that “the loser, whether plaintiff or defendant,
must pay the winner’s attorney’s fees.”44 Taking the example
described above, in the event of litigation, a contract between A
and B that contains a two-way fee-shifting provision will allow
for the successful litigant to recover its attorneys’ fees from the
unsuccessful litigant, irrespective of whether the successful
litigant is company A or company B. This two-way fee-shifting
regime deviates substantially from the standard American Rule,
and is the truest form of the English Rule.
B.

The American Rule Versus the English Rule
1. The American Rule

Throughout the modern world and its many legal
systems, there are variations and different approaches to how
litigating parties should allocate attorney fees and costs. One of
the main approaches among these variations includes the
“American Rule.” As described above, the American Rule (which
is mainly used only in the United States)45 requires both sides of
a dispute to pay their own attorneys’ fees, despite who wins or
who loses.46
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the American
Rule is ordinarily the default rule when it comes to the allocation
of attorney fees; however, there are exceptions that exist which
Id. at 1590.
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 327, 329 (2013) (noting that every U.S. state (subject to exceptions) uses the
American Rule as its “prevailing norm,” except for Alaska, which uses the English rule);
see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (“In the
United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable
attorneys’ fee from the loser.”); Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the
Efficiency of the English Rule Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 1, 34 (2006) (“There is no doubt that on the international level the American
Rule serves as the exception rather than the rule.”).
46 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 328–29 (“The American rule on attorney
fees ordinarily requires parties litigating disputes to compensate their own attorneys
regardless of the outcome.”); see also American Rule, supra note 26 (“The general policy that
all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fees.”); Vargo, supra
note 43, at 1569 (“In the United States, the losing party does not generally pay the winner’s
legal fees. Each party is only obligated to pay his or her own attorney’s fees, regardless of
the outcome of the litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
44
45
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would allow for the shifting of these fees.47 The courts have
generally recognized six exceptions to the American Rule:
contracts, common fund, Substantial Benefit Doctrine, contempt,
bad faith, and statutes and rules of procedure.48 Among these
exceptions, the most applicable to the analysis at hand are the
“contracts” and the “statutes and rules of procedure”49 exceptions.
Under the contracts exception, courts, including the
United States Supreme Court and the Delaware Supreme Court,
have allowed contracting parties to forgo the American Rule and
allocate attorneys’ fees in whatever fashion they agree upon.50 The
most common types of contractual agreements into which parties
choose to “incorporate fee-shifting provisions include promissory
notes, bills of sale, mortgage instruments, and insurance
contracts.”51 Moreover, and most importantly, the Delaware
Supreme Court has explicitly held that the bylaws of a publicly
held corporation act as a contract between the stockholders and
the corporation itself.52 As such, one would assume that a
corporation could include this exception in its bylaws and shift the
liability for attorneys’ fees onto a losing party.
The statutes and rules of procedure exception allows
states to enact legislation that deals directly with the allocation
of attorneys’ fees, and thus, if desired, forgo the default
47 Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257 (“Other recent cases have also reaffirmed
the general rule that, absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own
attorneys’ fees.” (emphasis added)); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1967) (“The rule here has long been that attorney’s fees are not
ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing
therefor. . . . Limited exceptions to the American rule have, of course, developed.”
(emphasis added)); see also Bungard, supra note 45, at 33 (“[T]he United States
Supreme Court has been quite clear on the fee-shifting issue since 1796. In the 1796
case, Arcambel v. Wiseman, the Court ruled that it would not create a general rule
independent of any statute permitting the award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party, holding: ‘The general practice of the United States is in opposition [sic] to it; and
even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of
the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.’” (quoting Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796))).
48 See generally Vargo, supra note 43, at 1578–90.
49 Id. at 1587–88 (“Statutory provisions for shifting attorney’s fees are not
really exceptions to the American Rule, but a part of it.”).
50 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257 (noting the exception of an “enforceable
contract” to the American rule); ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554,
558 (Del. 2014) (“[I]t is settled that contracting parties may agree to modify the American
Rule and obligate the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.”).
51 Vargo, supra note 43, at 1578 (footnotes omitted).
52 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558 (“[C]orporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a
corporation’s shareholders’ . . . .”); Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182,
1188 (Del. 2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s
shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”); Centaur Partners,
IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among the shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of
contract interpretation are held to apply.”).
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American Rule.53 “There are over 200 federal statutes and
almost 2000 state statutes that provide for shifting of attorney’s
fees”;54 however, out of all these statutes, the vast majority of
them are one-way fee-shifting.55 In fact, only two states have
actually chosen to implement two-way fee-shifting rules—
Alaska and Texas. In Alaska, Rule 82 of the Alaska Court Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that “the prevailing party in a civil
case shall be awarded attorney’s fees calculated under this
rule.”56 Meanwhile, in Texas, Rule 91a.7 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure dictates that, if a party moves to dismiss a cause
of action on the grounds that it is meritless, “the court must
award the prevailing party on the motion all costs and
reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred with respect to
the challenged cause of action in the trial court.”57 Rules such as
those in Alaska and Texas cut against the grain of using the
standard American Rule and instead reflect the other main
approach of attorney fee allocation—the English Rule.
2. The English Rule
Under the English Rule, the losing party pays the winning
party’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.58 This rule is generally used by
most of the Western World,59 although as previously mentioned,
Alaska and Texas have also explicitly adopted this rule under the
statutes and rules of procedure exception.60 Under the modern
practice in England,
the solicitor representing the winning party [regardless of whether it
is the plaintiff or defendant] prepares a bill of costs, detailing each
item of taxable expense. If the losing party agrees, it pays the bill;
parties, however, rarely agree. When disputed, the parties present
53 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257 (noting the exception of a “statute” to
the American Rule); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 329 (“Variations on the
American and English rules exist, including a California statute requiring a party to pay
its adversary’s fees if the party loses in litigation under a contract that specifies that the
party is to receive fees from its adversary if it prevails.”).
54 Vargo, supra note 43, at 1588 (footnotes omitted); see also SUSANNE DI
PIETRO ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA’S ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE
SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 14–15 (1995), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F45K-YPSP].
55 See DI PIETRO ET AL., supra note 54, at 14–15.
56 ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a).
57 TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7.
58 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 329; Bungard, supra note 45, at 7
(“The English Rule . . . provides that the losing party is responsible for the winning
party’s legal fees.”).
59 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 329; Bungard, supra note 45, at 34
(“In most civil law countries the codes specifically require courts to impose costs,
inclusive of attorneys’ fees, on the defeated party.”).
60 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 329; Bungard, supra note 45, at 34.
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their itemized expenses to a taxing master who decides the
appropriate amounts after a hearing.61

The creation of the English Rule originated centuries ago,
where “[a]t common law, fee awards were based solely on
statute.”62 In fact, “[t]he law concerning attorney fee shifting as
it developed in England was a creature of statute.”63 Over the
course of hundreds of years, English statutes have slowly shifted
the ability to recover attorneys’ fees from only successful
plaintiffs, to now successful litigants.64 “Absent enabling
legislation, the English Rule would mirror the American Rule
where the ‘loser’ is not responsible for the attorney’s fees of the
‘winner.’”65 Today, Delaware’s enactment of DGCL Section 102(f)
and amendment of Section 109(b) solidifies the use of the
American Rule with respect to shareholder derivative suits,
which, although perfectly justifiable under the statutes and
rules of procedure exception, fails to account for the
longstanding contracts exception that Delaware courts have
consistently recognized.66
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF DGCL SECTIONS 102(f) AND 109(b)

A.

Delaware Fee-Shifting Prior to ATP Tour

Prior to ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,
although the Delaware Supreme Court had never addressed
whether a fee-shifting provision found in a Delaware corporation’s
articles of incorporation or bylaws was valid or legal,67 it had

Vargo, supra note 43, at 1571 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1570.
63 Id. at 1571.
64 Id. at 1570–71. It took centuries for plaintiffs and defendants to become
equal in the allocation of attorneys’ fees:
61
62

In 1278, the Statutes of Gloucester allowed only the victorious plaintiff to
recover attorney’s fees in specified actions. Not until two centuries later could a
defendant recover attorney’s fees, and then only in isolated instances. By 1607,
a defendant could recover fees on the same basis as a winning plaintiff. In 1875,
the Rules of Court gave English courts the discretion to determine the amounts
that could be awarded to a prevailing litigant.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65 Id. at 1571 (footnotes omitted).
66 See cases cited supra note 52.
67 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014)
(providing that the district court’s reasoning for remanding the case regarding bylaw
fee-shifting provisions to the Delaware Supreme Court was due to the “novel question
of Delaware law that should be addressed in the first instance by [the Delaware
Supreme] Court”).
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addressed, numerous times,68 Delaware’s standard policy of
following the default American Rule and, consequently, the
generally recognized contracts exception to the rule.69 Yet, even
with Delaware’s adherence to the American Rule and its contracts
exception, there were only a “modest number of public companies
[that had] adopted various forms of fee-shifting prior to ATP.”70
On May 8, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its
opinion in ATP Tour, effectively ruling that fee-shifting
provisions in company bylaws are valid.71 ATP Tour, Inc. (ATP)
is a nonstock, “membership corporation”72 incorporated in
Delaware that “operates a global professional men’s tennis
tour.”73 The members of the corporation include professional
tennis players as well as various entities that operate and
organize professional tennis tournaments.74 Deutscher Tennis
Bund (Deutscher), the original plaintiff in the case, was one of
those entities.75
In the early 1990s, after joining ATP, Deutscher entered
into an agreement with ATP whereby both parties “agreed to be
bound by ATP’s Bylaws, as amended from time to time.”76 In
2006, ATP’s seven-member board of directors ratified the
amendment that was at issue (Article 23.3(a)), a bylaw which
essentially provided, inter alia, that if any member of the
corporation brings suit against the corporation or against the ATP
board, and the court rules against the members, all of the
members that participated in the suit will be jointly and severally
68 Id. at 558 (“Delaware follows the American Rule, under which parties to
litigation generally must pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs.”); Sternberg v.
Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212, 1220 (Del. 2013) (“Under the American Rule
and Delaware law, litigants are normally responsible for paying their own litigation
costs.”); Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Grp. Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1041 (Del. 1996) (“The
standards for awarding attorney’s fees in litigation by the [Delaware] Court of Chancery
are well established. The starting principle is a recognition of the so-called ‘American
Rule.’” (internal citations omitted)).
69 Sternberg, 62 A.3d at 1220 (“Under the American Rule and Delaware law,
litigants are normally responsible for paying their own litigation costs. An exception to
this rule is found in contract litigation that involves a fee shifting provision.”).
70 Claudia H. Allen, Fee-Shifting Bylaws: Where Are We Now?, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.bna.com/feeshifting-bylaws-n17179922685/ [https://perma.cc/4Q
SC-7RJ2].
71 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558.
72 Membership Corporation, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“A
distinct kind of corporation authorized under the statutes of most jurisdictions, existing
for purposes other than profit, often for charitable, fraternal, social, or religious purposes,
in which the participants acquire the status of members rather than stockholders.”). As
such, a “membership corporation” is technically not a “stock corporation” or “publicly
traded corporation,” but for purposes of this note, this distinction is irrelevant.
73 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 555.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 556.
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liable for the board’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation expenses.77
This bylaw, utilizing the contracts exception to the American Rule,
shifted the liability of attorneys’ fees from the traditionally used
American Rule, to the “loser pays” English Rule.
The controversy in ATP Tour began in 2007—one year
after the addition of the fee-shifting provision to ATP’s bylaws—
when ATP decided to downgrade the professional tennis
tournament that Deutscher owned and operated from the
highest tier to the second highest tier, while simultaneously
changing the season in which the tournament was played from
spring to summer.78 Taking offense to these changes, Deutscher
brought suit against “ATP and six of its board members in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
alleging both federal antitrust claims and Delaware fiduciary
duty claims.”79 After the district court ruled in favor of ATP,
ATP moved to recover its attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses,
pursuant to Article 23.3(a) of its bylaws.80
The district court, however, denied the motion, citing
various policy concerns as well as federal preemption issues
with respect to federal antitrust law.81 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held “the District
Court should have decided whether Article 23.3(a) was
enforceable as a matter of Delaware law before reaching the
federal preemption question,”82 and remanded the case back to
77

Id. The bylaw at issue here, Article 23.3(a), states:

In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on their
behalf (“Claiming Party”)] initiates or asserts any [claim or counterclaim
(“Claim”)] or joins, offers substantial assistance to or has a direct financial
interest in any Claim against the League or any member or Owner (including
any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member), and (ii)
the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial assistance from
the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial
interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves,
in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party
shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any such
member or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description
(including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation
expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in
connection with such Claim.
Id. (alterations in original).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. (citing to Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 2009 WL 3367041, at *3 (D. Del. Oct.
19, 2009) (“Furthermore, allowing antitrust defendants to collect attorneys fees in this
case would be contrary both to longstanding Third Circuit precedent and to the policies
underlying federal antitrust laws.”)).
82 Id. at 556–57 (citing to Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 480 Fed.
App’x 124, 127–28 (3d Cir. 2012)).
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the district court.83 “On remand, the District Court reasoned
that the question of Article 23.3(a)’s enforceability was a novel
question of Delaware law that should be addressed in the first
instance by [the Delaware Supreme] Court.”84 Thereafter, four
questions of law were certified for the Delaware Supreme Court
to answer, the first of which directly addressed whether a
nonstock corporation may legally enact a fee-shifting provision
in its bylaws allocating attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses to
the losing party.85
The Delaware Supreme Court, after analyzing the first
certified question, held that “[f]ee-shifting bylaws are permissible
under Delaware Law.”86 The court first established the legality of
the bylaw in question by evaluating the necessary requirements
in order for a bylaw to be considered valid.87 After finding that
the nature of fee-shifting bylaws in general are valid,88 especially
since “no principle of common law prohibits directors from
enacting fee-shifting bylaws,”89 the court considered the potential
implications that may arise from Delaware’s traditional use of
the American Rule with respect to the allocation of attorneys’
fees.90 In response to that inquiry, the court noted:

Id.
Id. at 557.
85 Id. (emphasis added). Out of the four questions certified to the Delaware
Supreme Court, the first question is the most pertinent to the issue this note
addresses. It provided:
83
84

May the Board of a Delaware non-stock corporation lawfully adopt a bylaw (i)
that applies in the event that a member brings a claim against another
member, a member sues the corporation, or the corporation sues a member
(ii) pursuant to which the claimant is obligated to pay for “all fees, costs, and
expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all
reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses)” of the party against
which the claim is made in the event that the claimant “does not obtain a
judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and
amount, the full remedy sought”?
Id.

Id. at 557–58.
Id. (“Under Delaware law, a corporation’s bylaws are ‘presumed to be valid,
and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law rather than
strike down the bylaws.’ To be facially valid, a bylaw must be authorized by the Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL), consistent with the corporation’s certificate of
incorporation, and its enactment must not be otherwise prohibited.” (footnotes omitted)).
88 Id. at 558 (“A fee-shifting bylaw, like the one described in the first certified
question, is facially valid. Neither the DGCL nor any other Delaware statute forbids the
enactment of fee-shifting bylaws. A bylaw that allocates risk among parties in intracorporate litigation would also appear to satisfy the DGCL’s requirement that bylaws
must ‘relat[e] to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or
powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.’”).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 554, 558.
86
87
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[Although] Delaware follows the American Rule . . . . it is settled
that contracting parties may agree to modify the American Rule and
obligate the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees. Because
corporate bylaws are “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,”
a fee-shifting provision contained in a nonstock corporation’s validlyenacted bylaw would fall within the contractual exception to the
American Rule.91

Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court held that due
to the valid nature of fee-shifting bylaws generally, and due to the
fact that a corporation’s bylaws are “contracts among a
corporation’s shareholders,”92 a fee-shifting provision, in a
nonstock corporation’s bylaws, falls within the contracts exception
to the American Rule, and therefore is legally valid.93 The
Delaware State Legislature, appearing to take offense to this
ruling, moved quickly to “correct” the issue that the Delaware
Supreme Court had just seemingly created.94
B.

Fee-Shifting Post-ATP Tour: The Reaction of the
Delaware Legislature

Generally, whenever the Delaware Legislature modifies
the DGCL, there is a good chance that the Section of Corporation
Law of the Delaware State Bar Association (hereinafter Delaware
Corporation Law Council) was behind it.95 True to form, it came
as no surprise when, less than a month after the ATP Tour
opinion was issued, the Delaware Legislature (in particular, the
Delaware State Senate) debated whether to ratify an addition and
amendment to the DGCL that was proposed by the Delaware
Corporation Law Council, and subsequently the Delaware State
Bar Association.96 After careful deliberations surrounding the
91 Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing Sternberg v. Nanticoke
Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212, 1218 (Del. 2013)).
92 Id. (quoting Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188
(Del. 2010)).
93 Note that the particular facts of ATP Tour and the narrow language used by
the court dictate that its holding applies to nonstock corporation bylaws only. Id. at 555.
94 Lisa A. Rickard, Delaware Flirts with Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-withencouraging-shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328 [https://perma.cc/78CT-CRVT] (“Weeks
after the court’s ruling, the Delaware legislature, cheered on and supported by the
powerful state plaintiffs bar, attempted to pass a law ‘fixing’ the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision. Far from a fix, the bill would have outlawed a company’s ability to use
the fee-shifting tool to protect itself against frivolous litigation.”).
95 Ed Batts, In an Abrupt Reversal, Delaware Says “Ummm . . . Wait!” to Fee
Shifting Bylaws, DLA PIPER (May 27, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/
publications/2014/05/in-an-abrupt-reversal/ [https://perma.cc/B2XW-MMCF] (“Changes
to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) are normally a rather rubber-stamp
affair—the Delaware State Bar Association recommends a change and the Delaware
legislature dutifully tends to follow the advice of its experts . . . .”).
96 See Rickard, supra note 94.
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initial proposal—Senate Bill No. 236—followed by a
postponement of the issue until the following term, the
Delaware Legislature ultimately adopted Senate Bill No. 75,
which addressed the ATP Tour decision.97
1. Senate Bill No. 236
Just days after the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
in ATP Tour, the Delaware Corporation Law Council took
action. Fearing that the court’s decision—which only applied to
nonstock companies—could easily be applied to publicly traded
companies as well, the Delaware Corporation Law Council
began “circulat[ing] among practitioners a draft of an
amendment that would specifically limit stock corporations’ use
of fee-shifting bylaws.”98 According to Norman Monhait, the
Chair of the Delaware Corporation Law Council at the time the
amendment was proposed,99 the reason behind such an
amendment was simple: “The significant liability risk created by
such a provision could drastically reduce the ability of
stockholders to bring even meritorious claims.”100 After receiving
approval by both the Delaware Corporation Law Council and the
Delaware State Bar Association, the amendment was sent to the
Delaware State Senate.101 The State Senate quickly approved the
proposed addition and amendments to the DGCL, which were
encompassed in Senate Bill No. 236 (S.B. 236). Dealing only with
the issue raised in ATP Tour, S.B. 236 provided for the
amendment of DGCL Sections 102(b)(6) and 114, as well the
formation of an entire new section—Section 331.102
As one of S.B. 236’s major additions to the DGCL, Section
331 addressed the monetary liability of stockholders, stating,
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, neither
the certificate of incorporation nor the bylaws of any corporation
97 See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that “[t]he proposed
legislation arises from the Delaware Supreme Court’s . . . decision in ATP Tour Inc. v.
Deutscher Tennis Bund”).
98 Karlee Weinmann, Del. Attys Push to Shield Stock Cos. from Fee-Shifting
Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/540901/del-attys-pushto-shield-stock-cos-from-fee-shifting-ruling [https://perma.cc/J2QZ-8U7A].
99 See About the Section of Corporation Law, DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://
www.dsba.org/sections-committees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/ [https://perma.cc/
MK8B-VRNE] (listing Norman Monhait as the “Immediate Past Chair”); see also
Weinmann, supra note 98.
100 Weinmann, supra note 98 (quoting Norman Monhait, head of the
Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar).
101 Karlee Weinmann, Fee-Shifting Ban Heads to Del. Capitol, LAW360 (May 29,
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/542550/fee-shifting-ban-heads-to-del-capitol [https://
perma.cc/R99S-XT8C].
102 S.B. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014).
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may impose monetary liability, or responsibility for any debts of
the corporation, on any stockholder of the corporation, except to
the extent permitted by Sections 102(b)(6) and 202 of this
title.”103 As follows, S.B. 236 mainly amended Section 102(b)(6),
which provided the following (addition underlined):
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the
certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the
certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the
following matters: (6) A provision imposing personal liability for the
debts of the corporation on its stockholders based solely on their
stock ownership, to a specified extent and upon specified conditions;
otherwise, the stockholders of a corporation shall not be personally
liable for the payment of the corporation’s debts except as they may
be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts.104

Reading Section 331 in conjunction with Section
102(b)(6) provides that, in the certificate of incorporation and
the bylaws of a stock corporation, the only provision imposing
monetary liability on a shareholder can be one that is “based
solely on [the shareholder’s] stock ownership,”105 and not one that
is based on “any debts of the corporation”106 (e.g., attorneys’ fees
incurred by directors or officers in the process of litigation).107
Therefore, under proposed Sections 102(b)(6) and 331, fee-shifting
provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of a stock
corporation that impose liability on shareholders for the attorneys’
fees incurred by directors or officers during the course of
shareholder derivative actions would be invalid.108 Not only did
these additions to the DGCL address the Delaware Corporation
Law Council’s concerns that the ruling from ATP Tour would
“spill-over” and apply to stock corporations as well,109 but they
also avoided explicitly overruling ATP Tour, because that decision
technically only applied to nonstock corporations.
However, just as S.B. 236 had enthusiastic supporters
in the form of the Delaware Corporation Law Council, it also
had its opponents. Delaware corporations such as Dole Food
Company, Inc. as well as public interest groups such as the
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) vehemently
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. (“Under new Section 331 and Section 102(b)(6) as amended, a provision
of the certificate of incorporation or bylaws that would purport to require a holder of
stock in a stock corporation to pay expenses incurred by the corporation, its directors,
officers, employees, agents or controlling stockholders in connection with litigation
initiated or claims prosecuted by the stockholder would be facially invalid.”).
109 See Weinmann, supra note 98.
103
104
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opposed the new legislation.110 The ILR expressed its staunch
opposition to S.B. 236 in a letter to Senator Bryan Townsend,111
the primary sponsor of S.B. 236,112 and in a letter sent to the
Members of the Delaware General Assembly.113 The letter to
Senator Townsend requested that he “consider deferring
consideration of S.B. 236 in order to allow [for] a more robust
discussion on the broader issues raised by this legislation.”114 The
letter to the Members of the General Assembly was more forceful,
urging them to reject S.B. 236 in its entirety based on the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in ATP Tour, the expedited
nature of the legislation, and the fact that S.B. 236 will virtually
condemn shareholders to “wholly unjustified costs.”115
To the surprise of some commentators, Senator
Townsend and the Delaware Assembly heeded the ILR’s
warnings and decided to postpone hearings on S.B. 236 until the
fall term.116 Although the Delaware State Senate approved S.B.
110 See Letter from C. Michael Carter, Dole Food Co., to the Honorable Bryan
Townsend, Del. State Senator (June 9, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
1184980-dole-letter-to-townsend.html [https://perma.cc/TS4W-NK5N] (stating that S.B.
236 “is anti-business and will only serve to encourage the appraisal arbitrage lawsuits
that have become so commonplace against companies in Delaware”); see Letter from Lisa
A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Norman Monhait,
Chairman, Section of Corp. Law, Del. State Bar Ass’n (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/de-bar-letter-4_8_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD5G-TPE4]
[hereinafter Rickard, April 4 Letter] (“The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (the ‘Chamber’) is
the world’s largest business federation, representing the interests of more than three million
companies of every size, sector, and region. ILR is an affiliate of the Chamber dedicated to
making our nation’s overall civil legal system simpler, faster, and fair for all participants.”).
111 See Letter from Andrew Wynne, Dir., State Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to the Honorable Bryan Townsend, Del. State Senator
(June 5, 2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1184979/chamber-letter-totownsend.pdf.
112 S.B. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014).
113 See Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform, to Members of the Del. Gen. Assembly (June 9, 2014), https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/1184978/chamber-letter-to-lawmakers.pdf [hereinafter Rickard,
June 9 Letter].
114 See Wynne, supra note 111.
115 See Rickard, June 9 Letter, supra note 113 (“Notwithstanding the Delaware
courts’ deep experience on these matters, SB 236 would overturn the Delaware Supreme
Court’s unanimous ruling in the ATP Tour case—and it would do so on an extraordinarily
expedited basis . . . . Abusive intra-corporate litigation has become an extremely serious
problem that imposes very substantial and wholly unjustified costs upon shareholders in
Delaware companies.”).
116 Alison Frankel, Big Pension Funds Mobilize Against Delaware Fee-Shifting
Clauses, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/11/26/
big-pension-funds-mobilize-against-delaware-fee-shifting-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/Q8
W5-STZQ] (“Typically, according to my Reuters colleague Tom Hals, when the state bar
backs a proposed law, Delaware legislators pass it. But not this time. Delaware
lawmakers tabled the proposed law just a few days after the Chamber sent its letters.”);
see also Jonathon Starkey, Chamber Forces Delay on Fee-Shifting Legislation, DEL.
ONLINE (June 10, 2014), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2014/06/1
0/fee-shifting-bill/10280791/ [https://perma.cc/3MBH-A2UQ] [hereinafter Starkey, Chamber
Forces Delay on Fee-Shifting]; Jonathan Starkey, Fee-Shifting Bylaw Bill Tabled Until
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236, instead of pushing it through to the Delaware House of
Representatives for review, the Senate adopted a resolution
“asking the corporate section of the state Bar Association to
‘continue examination’ of measures that would address feeshifting.”117 Senator Townsend expressed his opinion that
“Delaware truly respects the views of the business community,”
and noted that he is “happy to encourage discussions about ways
we can limit frivolous litigation.”118
In the intervening time between the tabling of S.B. 236
in June of 2014 and the Delaware State Senate reopening the
discussion in 2015, contrary to the initial concerns of the
Delaware State Bar Association, the number of Delaware
public corporations that adopted fee-shifting bylaws remained
modest: “Since ATP, and despite claims that large numbers of
public companies would adopt fee-shifting bylaws, only 39
domestic corporations, out of the approximately 5,000 public
companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges have acted.”119
As some commentators have noted, however, publicly
traded companies incorporated in Delaware might have been
hesitant to begin implementing fee-shifting provisions in their
bylaws or articles of incorporation right after the ATP Tour
decision.120 “That such a small number of companies had done
so doubtless[ly] reflected concern by corporate directors over
opposition from shareholder activists.”121 In other words,
companies might have believed that once discussions regarding
S.B. 236 were reopened in 2015, the Delaware Legislature
would heed the advice of the Delaware Corporation Law
Council—who plays a large role in DGCL amendments122 and
who quickly criticized the ATP Tour decision—and enact
legislation that prohibits fee-shifting provisions.123 Due to this
2015, DEL. ONLINE (June 19, 2014), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2
014/06/19/delaware-general-assembly-tables-legal-fee-shifting-bylaw-bill/10946611/ [https://
perma.cc/ZAT2-M8Y4] [hereinafter Starkey, Fee-Shifting Bylaw Tabled].
117 Starkey, Fee-Shifting Bylaw Tabled, supra note 116; see also S.J. Res. 12,
147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014).
118 Starkey, Chamber Forces Delay on Fee-Shifting, supra note 116.
119 Allen, supra note 70 (footnotes omitted).
120 Frankel, supra note 116 (“So far, big U.S. corporations have been reluctant
to adopt fee-shifting clauses.”).
121 Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 6.
122 Batts, supra note 95; see supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also
Frankel, supra note 116.
123 See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 6 (“The legal uncertainty created by the
Delaware legislature’s effort to overturn the ATP decision also loomed as a potential
deterrent, as many observers expected that the legislature would ultimately opt to ban
fee-shifting.”). In an interview with Lee Rudy, of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, Angela
Frankel reported that Rudy told her that “corporations may be waiting to see what the
Delaware legislature says about fee-shifting, or may be reluctant to adopt provisions until
they are endorsed by Chancery Court.” Frankel, supra note 116.
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likelihood, logic dictates that a company would wait until the
Delaware Legislature had a chance to address S.B. 236 again
in 2015 before going through the tedious process124 of amending
its bylaws to incorporate a fee-shifting provision, just to have it
ruled invalid by the Legislature and be forced to remove the
provision or be subject to litigation.125
2. Senate Bill No. 75
When the Delaware Legislature reconvened in 2015, all
eyes were on the Delaware State Bar Association to see whether
they would propose any new amendments to the DGCL similar to
those proposed in S.B. 236. That question was answered
affirmatively in March when the Delaware State Bar Association
issued their proposed amendments to the DGCL (S.B. 75).126
Along with these amendments, the Delaware State Bar
Association issued an explanation regarding the reasoning behind
their decision.127
Whereas S.B. 236 did not explicitly provide for the
prohibition of fee-shifting provisions, S.B. 75 struck right to the
core of the issue presented by ATP Tour. S.B. 75, inter alia,
contained amendments to Sections 102 and 109(b) of the DGCL
that dealt directly with fee-shifting provisions. The proposed
amendment to Section 102, found in the newly added subsection
(f), provided: “The certificate of incorporation may not contain
any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for
the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other
party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as
defined in § 115 of this title.”128 Likewise, the proposed
amendment to Section 109(b) extended the prohibition of feeshifting provisions from the articles of incorporation to the
bylaws of a publicly traded company, providing: “The bylaws
may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation
124 Henry duPont Ridgely, Essay, The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate
Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 317, 320 (2015) (“For public companies, a shareholder vote
to approve a bylaw requires proxy access. . . . Yet for the corporation and shareholders
alike, the proxy process can be complex and involve the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).”).
125 See Frankel, supra note 116 (“If Delaware lawmakers or judges say
explicitly that fee-shifting is legal for companies with public shareholders, Rudy said,
‘you’ll see a flood of these bylaws.’”).
126 See Jeff C. Dodd & James Edward Maloney, Proposed Delaware Legislation
Would Prohibit Fee-Shifting Provisions for Stock Corporations, ANDREWS KURTH (Mar. 12,
2015), https://www.andrewskurth.com/insights-1196.html [https://perma.cc/9YKY-NDRL].
127 Id.; see DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 3; infra Part III.
128 S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2015).
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or any other party in connection with an internal corporate
claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”129 Also under S.B. 75,
“internal corporate claims” would be defined under the newly
added Section 115 as “claims, including claims in the right of
the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by
a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon
the Court of Chancery.”130
Read together, S.B. 75’s new amendments to Sections
102(f) and 109(b) provide that a publicly traded company may
not include a provision in its bylaws or certificate of
incorporation that would shift the liability of the corporation’s
attorneys’ fees onto a plaintiff-stockholder in the event such
stockholder was the losing party in a shareholder derivative
suit. Essentially, Sections 102(f) and 109(b) solidify the use of
the American Rule (that shareholder derivative suit litigants
pay their own attorneys’ fees regardless of the outcome) and
prohibit a publicly held corporation from adopting any bylaw or
charter provision that establishes the use of the English Rule
(that unsuccessful litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees as
well as the attorneys’ fees of the successful litigant).
On April 29, 2015, S.B. 75 was assigned to the Senate
Judiciary Committee and proceeded quickly through the
Delaware Legislature.131 Approximately one month later, after
S.B. 75 was approved by the Delaware State Senate and pushed
through for review by the Delaware House of Representatives,
the House Judiciary Committee heard unopposed testimony in
which Norman Monhait explained “that the ban would simply
maintain the status quo by statutorily prohibiting corporations
from adopting such bylaws.”132 Thereafter, the House of
Representatives moved extraordinarily fast, approving S.B. 75
by a unanimous vote within a matter of days.133 On June 24,
Id.
Id.
131 Senate Bill 75: 148th General Assembly (2015–2016), supra note 25
(Actions History).
132 H. Judiciary Comm. Meeting Minutes (Del. June 3, 2015), http://phoenix.
state.de.us/LIS/lis148.nsf/6d7bc5d1188131fa85257e0a0055604b/e0a816faaba21d6585257
e4a006400ce/$FILE/6.3.15%20House%20Judiciary%20Committee%20Meeting%20Minut
es.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YK5-7TKK]; see S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2015) (stating in
the synopsis that the addition to Section 109(b) and the amendment to Section 102(f) “[do]
not disturb [the ATP Tour] ruling in relation to nonstock corporations”).
133 Senate Bill 75: 148th General Assembly (2015–2016), supra note 25 (The
Actions History states that S.B. 75 was assigned to the Judiciary Committee in the
Senate for review on April 29, 2015. It was reported out of the judiciary committee on
May 6, and sent to the Senate for review. On May 12, the Delaware State Senate passed
S.B. 75 with a vote of “16 YES 5 NO.” On June 11, after S.B. 75 had been assigned and
reported out of the Judiciary Committee in the House of Representatives, the House of
129
130
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2015, Governor Jack Markell signed into law S.B. 75, which
took effect on August 1, 2015,134 formally amending Delaware
General Corporation Law Sections 102(f) and 109(b).135
Adjoined to S.B. 75 was a Synopsis of the Delaware
Legislature’s reasoning behind the adoption of each proposed
amendment, which stated that the amendments to Sections
102(f) and 109(b) invalidating fee-shifting provisions would
“preserve the efficacy of the enforcement of fiduciary duties in
stock corporations.”136
Despite the seemingly smooth and expedited nature of
S.B. 75, it did not go unopposed. As with S.B. 236, as soon as
the Delaware State Bar Association issued their proposed
amendments to Sections 102(f) and 109(b), the ILR issued a
press release in which they stated their opposition on the
grounds that the amendments did not adequately protect
against the “well-documented, longstanding problem of abusive
merger-and-acquisition litigation in Delaware.”137 The ILR
issued at least two more press releases during the life span of
S.B. 75, one after the Delaware State Senate’s vote approving
S.B. 75138 and another after the Governor of Delaware signed
S.B. 75 into law,139 both condemning the Delaware Legislature’s
approval of the amendments.140 Moreover, Lisa Rickard, the
President of the ILR, sent a letter to Norman Monhait
characterizing S.B. 75 as a proposal that “would eliminate an
important mechanism that corporations have turned to in order
to protect innocent shareholders against the significant costs of
abusive litigation without providing an adequate replacement
Representatives passed the legislation with a vote of “40 YES 0 NO.” On June 24, the
Governor of Delaware signed S.B. 75 into law.).
134 See S.B. 75.
135 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (2017).
136 S.B. 75 (“New subsection (f) is not intended, however, to prevent the
application of such provisions pursuant to a stockholders agreement or other writing
signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be enforced.”).
137 U.S. Chamber Comments on Introduction of Anti-“Fee Shifting” Legislation
in Delaware, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-chamber-comments-on-introduction-of-anti-feeshifting-legislation-in-delaware [https://perma.cc/GSM2-MXJV].
138 U.S. Chamber Comments on Delaware State Senate Vote on “Fee Shifting”
Bill, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (May 12, 2015), http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/resource/us-chamber-comments-on-delaware-state-senate-vote-on-feeshifting-bill [https://perma.cc/EQS6-C26V].
139 U.S. Chamber Disappointed in Enactment of Delaware’s Anti-“Fee Shifting”
Law, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (June 25, 2015), http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/resource/us-chamber-disappointed-in-enactment-of-delawares-anti-feeshifting-law [https://perma.cc/FBF6-9QXL].
140 See generally U.S. Chamber Comments On Delaware State Senate Vote on
“Fee Shifting” Bill, supra note 138; U.S. Chamber Disappointed in Enactment of
Delaware’s Anti-“Fee Shifting” Law, supra note 139.
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tool.”141 Despite this opposition, the Delaware Legislature still
decided to enact Sections 102(f) and 109(b), and today Delaware
corporations are left with the repercussions of that decision.
III.

RAMIFICATIONS OF DGCL SECTIONS 102(f) AND 109(b)

The decision to enact DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b)
solidifies the use of the American Rule, but contradicts the
long-standing contracts exception that has specifically been
accepted by the Supreme Court and the Delaware Supreme
Court.142 Whereas having a fee-shifting provision in a
corporation’s bylaws or certificate of incorporation can deter
frivolous litigation, Sections 102(f) and 109(b) incentivize
frivolous shareholder litigation, increase the already epidemic
levels of shareholder litigation stemming from corporate
mergers, and promote disinterest in board of director and
officer positions. Most importantly, Sections 102(f) and 109(b)
actually harm shareholders, a sentiment that was echoed by
Lisa Rickard,143 and is contrary to what the Delaware
Corporation Law Council contended.
A.

DCGL Section 102(f) and Section 109(b)’s Contradiction
to the Contracts Exception

As a policy consideration, it is necessary to point out
that the enactment of these statutes solidified the use of the
American Rule in regard to shareholder derivative actions
against a publicly traded company. Although this use of the
American Rule is nothing out of the ordinary, most jurisdictions,
including Delaware,144 have at least recognized the contracts
exception to the American Rule, which allows contracting
parties to set their own procedures with respect to the allocation
of attorneys’ fees and opt-out of the American Rule in favor of
some form of the English Rule.145 Furthermore, as the Delaware
Rickard, April 4 Letter, supra note 110.
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975)
(noting the exception of an “enforceable contract” to the American rule); ATP Tour, Inc. v.
Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) (“[I]t is settled that contracting
parties may agree to modify the American Rule and obligate the losing party to pay the
prevailing party’s fees.”); Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del.
2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders;
therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”); Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l
Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) (“Corporate charters and by-laws are
contracts among the shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract
interpretation are held to apply.”).
143 Rickard, April 4 Letter, supra note 110.
144 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 142 and accompanying text.
145 See supra Section I.A.
141

142
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Supreme Court has explicitly held, “Corporate bylaws are
‘contracts among a corporation’s shareholders.’”146 With the
enactment of Sections 102(f) and 109(b), however, the Delaware
Legislature has put a restriction on a publicly traded corporation’s
ability to invoke the contracts exception to the American Rule,
even if shareholders themselves wish to incorporate a fee-shifting
provision into the company’s bylaws or certificate of incorporation.
Although the statutes and rules of procedure exception
to the American Rule allows states to establish their own feeshifting regimes—which theoretically can include legislatively
solidifying the use of the American Rule—“[t]he major purpose
of state fee-shifting legislation is to compensate the prevailing
plaintiff, promote public interest litigation, punish or deter the
losing party for misconduct, or prevent abuse of the judicial
system.”147 The Delaware Legislature, however, has not adopted a
fee-shifting “strategy” that could promote meritorious litigation
while deterring frivolous litigation. Instead, Sections 102(f) and
109(b) simply codify the use of the American Rule and prevent
publicly traded companies, including their shareholders, from
utilizing the contracts exception to the American Rule. Although
at first glance this decision seems to protect shareholders, it in
fact hurts interested shareholders along with the officers and
board of directors of a corporation.
B.

Incentivizing Frivolous Shareholder Derivative Suits

DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b)’s codification of the
use of the American Rule in regard to shareholder derivative
suits has a high potential to lead to and incentivize frivolous
shareholder litigation.148 “A simple economic analysis of the two
general approaches to fee-shifting demonstrates that, assuming
all parties act rationally, American Rule plaintiffs are more
likely to file suits that are frivolous or have a low probability of
victory than English Rule plaintiffs,”149 because American Rule
plaintiffs face a far smaller penalty for losing. Generally, under
the American Rule in non-shareholder derivative suits, plaintiffs
146 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558 (quoting Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188); Centaur
Partners, IV, 582 A.2d at 928 (“Corporate charters and by-laws are contracts among the
shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation are held
to apply.”).
147 Vargo, supra note 43, at 1588.
148 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 335 (“The English rule holds the
potential, as its proponents argue, to deter frivolous or nonmeritorious lawsuits since a
defendant facing such a lawsuit has an incentive to vigorously litigate the case,
knowing that it will almost certainly win and its adversary will pay its fees.”).
149 Bungard, supra note 45, at 37.
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will only be liable for their own attorneys’ fees, regardless of
whether they win or lose.150 In shareholder derivative actions,
however, the plaintiff-shareholders are rarely liable for their
attorneys’ fees even if they win,151 as opposed to the defendantofficers and directors who will be liable for their own attorneys’
fees even if they successfully defend the suit.152 Instead, in
shareholder derivative suits, the plaintiff-shareholder brings suit
on behalf of the corporation; therefore, any recovery obtained by
the plaintiff goes back into the corporation, and not the plaintiff’s
pocket.153 Subsequently, “[b]ecause very few shareholders would
pay, out of their own pockets, the attorney’s fee for a suit that is
brought on the corporation’s behalf . . . very few derivative actions
would be brought if the law did not allow the plaintiff’s attorney
to be compensated by a contingent fee payable out of the
corporate recovery.”154 This “contingent fee” is generally derived
out of a “common fund” whereby the recovery received by the
corporation through successful litigation goes into a fund before it
is put back into the corporation, and the plaintiff-attorney receives
a percentage of said fund.155 Therefore, the plaintiff-shareholders
themselves do not pay any out-of-pocket attorneys’ fees.
Because plaintiff-shareholders in derivative litigation
are not paying their attorneys’ fees out-of-pocket, under the
American Rule, and now under Sections 102(f) and 109(b),
there is more incentive to bring frivolous claims,156 particularly
“strike suits”—shareholder derivative suits that are brought
without any merit and act as a nuisance for the corporation,
forcing the defendant-board of directors to weigh the pros and
cons of litigating, and ultimately determine whether to settle
rather than expend time, money, and resources on litigation.157
American Rule, supra note 26.
George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem,
100 VA. L. REV. 261, 291 (2014) (“[Shareholder derivative litigation] can be self-funding
because plaintiffs do not need to foot their legal bill for successful outcomes.”).
152 Id. at 291–92 (“Even if a corporation fights a claim to the bitter end and
prevails on the merits, it will still be stuck writing checks for its legal fees (or higher
insurance premiums).”).
153 See Erickson, supra note 31; supra note 31 and accompanying text.
154 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1121 (11th ed. 2014).
155 See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1253 (Del. 2012) (“The
common fund doctrine is a well-established basis for awarding attorneys’ fees in the
Court of Chancery.”).
156 Geis, supra note 151, at 290 (“If the corporation (or its insurer) foots the bill,
either directly or via contingency fee arrangements, this introduces a significant risk that
entrepreneurial lawyers will drum up hollow cases to generate buy-off settlements.”
(footnote omitted)).
157 Strike Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A suit (esp[ecially]
a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or
as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.”); see also KOJI F. FUKUMURA &
150
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An added problem is that in order to bring a shareholder
derivative suit, a shareholder need not be the holder of a
certain percentage of stock.158 Theoretically, a person could
choose a corporation, buy one share of stock in the corporation,
wait until the board of directors or officers makes a business
decision,159 hire an attorney, and then bring a strike suit
against the corporation in order to receive a quick payout.160
Similarly, DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b) pave the way for
misconduct by attorneys themselves, opening the door for an
attorney to search for potentially questionable officer or
director conduct in a corporation, find one person who owned at
least one share of stock in that corporation at the time of the
questionable conduct, and then bring a strike suit in order to
receive a quick payout.161 Mergers and acquisitions decisions
are particularly susceptible to this type of attorney misconduct:
over 80% of cases settle162 simply because a board of directors
does not have the time, money, or availability to deal with the
hassle of litigation while trying to conduct a merger. Although
procedural safeguards exist in the form of standing
requirements—e.g., the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative
suit must have had ownership of the company’s stock at the
time of the alleged misconduct163—the intrinsically meritless
PETER M. ADAMS, AM. BAR ASS’N, UPDATE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITIGATION:
M&A AND PROXY STRIKE SUITS (2013) (“Given the large stakes and often compressed
timeline, M&A class actions place defendant-companies on the horns of a dilemma.
Should they quickly settle the lawsuit(s), usually by agreeing to provide certain—
typically immaterial—supplemental disclosures, and pay a relatively modest award of
attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel? Or should they vigorously defend the lawsuit(s),
risking a possible injunction, delay (or even derailment) of the merger transaction, and
a larger payment of fees to plaintiffs’ counsel?”).
158 See Erickson, supra note 31, at 100 (“A shareholder can bring a derivative
suit if he owns only a single share of stock, and many derivative plaintiffs own little
more than this single share . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
159 Note that the business decision itself need not be illegal or even questionable,
for the very nature of a strike suit is that it is meritless. See Strike Suit, supra note 157.
160 Geis, supra note 151, at 290 (“The legal framework—which allows any
lawyer who can recruit a single shareholder to self-select as a firm protector and
precludes quick dismissals—is simply too tempting.”).
161 See id. (noting that attorneys often play the role of “watch-dog” and will
“take the reins” in a shareholder derivative suit while “working through nominal
plaintiff-shareholders”).
162 See Rickard, June 9 Letter, supra note 113.
163 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2017) (“In any derivative suit instituted by a
stockholder of a corporation, it shall be averred in the complaint that the plaintiff was a
stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder
complains or that such stockholder’s stock thereafter devolved upon such stockholder by
operation of law.”); see also Joseph M. McLaughlin, Standing in Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202622850
417/Standing-in-Shareholder-Derivative-Litigation?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL
[https://perma.cc/69B9-2GNK] (“By statute, Delaware law imposes a ‘contemporaneous
ownership’ requirement, which provides that a derivative plaintiff does not have standing
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nature of a strike suit eliminates the need for the plaintiff to be
a shareholder at the time actual misconduct occurs,164 thus
opening the door for a person to purchase a single share of
stock, wait until a business decision is made (even a valid or
legal one), and then bring suit.
C.

Increased Mergers and Acquisitions Litigation

The new additions to the DGCL also incentivize
shareholders to challenge mergers and acquisitions litigation in
an effort to achieve high payouts. In 2015, the world of Mergers
and Acquisitions saw record-breaking numbers.165 In 2015, almost
$2.3 trillion worth of deals were made, as compared to the year
2014 where roughly $1.4 trillion worth of deals were made.166
More so, as the ILR argued in their letters to the Delaware
Legislature and Delaware State Bar Association, litigation
stemming from these merger and acquisition deals was at an alltime high.167
Just about every merger or acquisition involving a significant public
company becomes a litigation target soon after the deal’s
announcement—94% of all deals valued at over $100 million [in the
year 2013] were targets of lawsuits; compared to 44% in 2007. No
one can seriously believe that every one of these transactions was
legally flawed.168

Although these numbers subsided slightly for the years 2014
and 2015, they remained astronomical. In 2014, 93% of all deals
valued at over $100 million were challenged through shareholder
litigation, with only one of those challenges actually proceeding to
trial.169 Even more troubling was the fact that 96% of all deals
valued at over $1 billion were challenged, with each deal receiving
roughly six lawsuits filed against it.170
In 2015 and for the first half of 2016, however, the
numbers continued to decrease. In 2015 and the first half of 2016,
to bring a derivative suit unless it was a shareholder or member at the time of the
transaction of which the plaintiff complains.”).
164 See Strike Suit, supra note 157.
165 See Maureen Farrell, 2015 Becomes the Biggest M&A Year Ever, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/2015-becomes-the-biggest-m-a-year-ever1449187101 [http://perma.cc/8AXF-BZTF] (“A slew of smaller takeovers announced
Wednesday officially made 2015 the biggest year ever for mergers and acquisitions.”).
166 PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON, LLP, M&A AT A GLANCE—
2015 YEAR-END ROUNDUP (2016), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3316690/maag_
2015_year-end_roundup.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MNQ-LTHH].
167 See Rickard, June 9 Letter, supra note 113.
168 See id. (footnote omitted).
169 KOUMRIAN, supra note 35, at 1.
170 Id. at 2.
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84% and 64%, respectively, of all deals valued over at $100
million were challenged through shareholder litigation.171 Reports
indicate, however, that this decrease could have resulted from the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2016 decision in In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litigation.172 In Trulia,173 the Chancery Court
effectively held that Delaware courts will begin to decline
“disclosure-only” settlements174 if it is found that said disclosures
are not “material.”175 For a disclosure to be considered material,
there must be “a substantial likelihood that it ‘significantly’
alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”176 As such,
the fact that Delaware courts were beginning to decline
disclosure-only settlements—which are prevalent in shareholder
derivative suits—could very well be a contributing factor as to
why, during the year 2015 and for the first half of 2016,
“[l]awsuits were less likely to be filed in the Delaware Court of
Chancery than in previous years.”177
The Trulia decision has a two-fold effect. First, other
state courts are not obligated to follow the Trulia decision, so
“disclosure-only” settlements are still available in states besides
Delaware.178 As such, shareholders (or more likely, plaintiffattorneys) who are looking to leverage a quick settlement through
the common disclosure-only framework, and subsequently collect
attorneys’ fees through the common fund method discussed supra,
171 RAVI SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 2
(2014),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-LitigationInvolving-Acquisitions-2016 [https://perma.cc/7KUV-6CE4].
172 See id.; see also Edward B. Micheletti & Keenan D. Lynch, Key Developments
in Delaware Corporation Law in 2016, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/key-developments-delaware-corporationlaw-2016 (“The [Trulia] decision sparked three observable trends in 2016: lower rates of
deal litigation generally, a declining share of such litigation in the Delaware Court of
Chancery relative to other states and courts, and decreased fee opportunities for plaintiffs’
lawyers. Although the long-term implications are not yet fully clear, we anticipate that
these trends will continue in 2017.”).
173 Although a complete analysis of In re Trulia is outside the scope of this note,
it will briefly be discussed in order to counter the hypothetical argument that, since M&A
litigation rates are down, the new amendments to the DGCL have not incentivized
frivolous shareholder litigation. Moreover, although In re Trulia dealt with a shareholder
class action lawsuit and not a shareholder derivative lawsuit, this analysis will assume
that the principles and holding of In re Trulia apply to derivative suits as well.
174 For a discussion on “disclosure-only” settlements, see supra Section I.A.
175 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887.
176 Id. at 899 (alteration in original) (quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp,
650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994)).
177 See SINHA, supra note 171, at 1.
178 Daniel W. Halston & Alexandra C. Boudreau, After In re Trulia: Increased
Scrutiny for the Give and the Get in Disclosure Settlements, WILMERHALE (Feb. 29,
2016), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=1
7179880878 [https://perma.cc/3VNE-QZD5] (“With disclosure-only settlements facing a
hostile reception in Delaware, plaintiffs may pursue deal litigation in other states.”).
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can still file suit in a state other than Delaware.179 Second, since
disclosure-only settlements are still available in other states, if
a shareholder of a Delaware corporation brings a derivative
suit against the corporation outside the state of Delaware,
those disclosure-only settlements can still result in large
attorneys’ fees; but now, since the Delaware corporation cannot
have a fee-shifting provision in its bylaws or certificate of
incorporation due to DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b), the
standard American Rule applies and the company’s board of
directors and officers will be liable for their own attorneys’ fees
while the plaintiff-shareholders will not be paying their legal
fees out of their own pockets.
Although Delaware corporations can now enact an
exclusive forum-selection clause pursuant to the newly
promulgated DGCL Section 115 in order to prevent plaintiffshareholders from bringing derivative suits outside the state of
Delaware,180 such a clause will not have a significant impact on
plaintiff-attorney misconduct or the collection of legal fees.181
Even if shareholders are forced to bring derivative suits in
Delaware, the court in Trulia specifically stated that the
heightened materiality standard that applies to the review of
disclosure-only settlements does not apply to the review of
mootness182 fee awards.183 Instead, to determine whether a
mootness fee award is reasonable, the court will analyze the
179 Meredith E. Kotler & Vanessa C. Richardson, Update About Disclosure-Only
Settlements in M&A Litigation, CLEARY M&A & CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (Aug. 23,
2016), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2016/08/update-about-disclosure-only-settlementsin-ma-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/ES6J-3CNT] (noting the recent decline in M&A
litigation filed in Delaware and “predict[ing] this trend will continue, and plaintiffs
instead may attempt to file these suits in other forums that may be more willing to accept
disclosure only settlements”).
180 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. 2016) (The
court acknowledged the potential for plaintiffs to “sue fiduciaries of Delaware
corporations in other jurisdictions in the hope of finding a forum more hospitable” to
disclosure-only settlements, however, Delaware corporations can proactively prevent this
because “[i]t is within the power of a Delaware corporation to enact a forum selection
bylaw to address this concern.”).
181 For further implications of DGCL Section 115, see discussion infra
Section IV.A.
182 Taking into account the prevalence of disclosure-only settlements, if
defendant-directors voluntarily make the disclosures that the plaintiffs are seeking, thus
making the plaintiffs’ claims moot, under the mootness doctrine the case is dismissed. In
re Trulia, 129 A.3d. at 896–97 (discussing the fact that when the defendants voluntarily
make the supplemental disclosures that the plaintiffs were seeking, the plaintiffs’ claims
become moot); Mootness Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The
principle that American courts will not decide moot cases—that is, cases in which there is
no longer any actual controversy.”).
183 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898, n.46 (“[A]n award of fees in the mootness fee
scenario may be appropriate for supplemental disclosures of less significance than
would be necessary to sustain approval of a settlement.”).
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voluntary disclosures made by the defendants and decide
whether the disclosures provided “some benefit to stockholders,
whether or not material to the vote.”184 Afterwards, the
plaintiff-attorney will petition the court to collect a fee for the
work that was performed on the lawsuit.185 As such, plaintiffattorneys still have an incentive to recruit shareholders to
bring strike suits against a Delaware corporation in the hope
that the defendant-directors will make voluntary disclosures.
Once the directors make the voluntary disclosures, an attorney
need only show that the disclosures had some benefit to the
corporation, and they will get paid for their “work.” Because
public companies cannot defend themselves by implementing
fee-shifting provisions, plaintiff-attorneys for potential strike
suit litigants will still see this as a quick way to receive a fairly
substantial payout for a minimal amount of work performed.
D.

Decreased Shareholder Protection

Delaware’s enactment of its new legislation will also
lead to a decrease in shareholder protection. The Delaware State
Bar Association, as one of the explanations for proposing the
amendments to the DGCL, reasoned that shareholder derivative
litigation is essentially the only form of control over a board of
directors breaching their fiduciary duty; therefore, shareholder
litigation is essential in order to protect shareholders.186 As such,
by solidifying the use of the American Rule through the banning
of fee-shifting provisions, shareholder litigation is preserved.187
At first glance this may seem true, and shareholders may rejoice
at the promulgation of DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b).
Contrary to this belief and the Delaware State Bar Association’s
contention, however, the solidification of the American Rule fails
to protect shareholders. Instead, it will result in harm to
184 In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS
117, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (stating that “[i]n other words, a helpful disclosure
may support a fee award in this [mootness] context”); see also Jack B. Jacobs et al.,
‘Mootness Fees’ in Deal Litigation: An Argument for a Different Approach, BLOOMBERG
L., Mar. 28, 2017, http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/bloomberg-bna-corporatecounsel-weekly_mootness-fees-final.pdf (“Delaware courts have facilitated, if not
encouraged, such [mootness] fee applications by applying a standard more lenient than
that applied in the context of a disclosure-only settlement fee application: the disclosure
need only be ‘helpful’ to class members.”).
185 In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *8–9
(“The theory under which a mootness fee is awarded is a subspecies of the commonbenefit doctrine, which recognizes that, where a litigation provides a benefit to a class
or group, costs necessary to the generation of that benefit should also be shared by the
group or its successor.”).
186 See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra, note 3, at 6.
187 See id.
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shareholders due to incentivized frivolous shareholder litigation,
which will drain corporate resources.
To conceptualize this problem, consider the following. In
bringing a shareholder derivative action, there is no formal
requirement as to how many shares of stock a shareholder must
own. Therefore, one person could buy a single share of stock of
Corporation A, bring a strike suit against A’s board of directors
and officers, and then settle for a fairly large amount. Under the
American Rule, the plaintiff-shareholder need only worry about
his own attorneys’ fees (which will be paid out as a percentage
from the amount reached in settlement or litigation), so not only
will the suit waste the time and money of the board of directors
and officers who are liable for their own attorneys’ fees, but it
will also waste the resources of the corporation, indirectly
harming other shareholders of Corporation A. This problem
applies to litigation challenging mergers as well:
A company’s shareholders suffer when one or both parties to a
merger transaction are forced to expend millions of dollars defending
suits in multiple courts and paying multiple attorneys’ fee awards in
connection with settlements necessary to eliminate legal uncertainty
and allow the transaction. Those expenditures reduce the funds
available to integrate the two companies effectively, expand the
business, or create new products, imposing a “merger tax” that
benefits lawyers and hurts shareholders.188

Consequently, long-term investors in a company that
want to see it grow and prosper become easy targets for less
interested shareholders, outsiders, and attorneys who only care
about receiving a quick payout. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge
has said:
In sum, shareholder litigation mainly serves as a means of
transferring wealth from investors to lawyers. At best, such suits
take money out of the firm’s residual value—at the expense of
current shareholders—and return it to former shareholders, minus
substantial legal fees. In many cases, moreover, no money is
returned to the shareholders or the corporate entity, but legal fees
are almost always paid.189

188
189

Rickard, June 9 Letter, supra note 113, at 2.
Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 11–12 (footnotes omitted).
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Essentially, while DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b) may seem
like strong protective measures, in actuality these amendments
indirectly harm shareholders and funnel resources directly
from the corporation into the pockets of plaintiff-attorneys.
E.

Decreased Incentive to Become a Board Member

The new additions to the DGCL also decrease incentive
to sit on a board of directors or become an officer of a Delaware
corporation. Generally, unlike the plaintiff-shareholder’s attorney,
who gets paid out of a recovery fund, the attorneys for the
defendant-board of directors and officers are paid out-of-pocket
by the defendant-board members and officers they represent190
(subject to Director and Officer Insurance discussed infra).
Under the American Rule, defendant-board members must
always pay this fee—whether or not they win. Therefore, the
American Rule strikes an imbalance in the allocation of
attorneys’ fees in regard to shareholder derivative suits in
favor of the shareholders to the detriment of the board of
directors and officers. This can naturally lead to a decreased
incentive in becoming a board member or officer due to the
knowledge that board members and officers will remain liable
for their own attorneys’ fees every time a shareholder brings an
unmeritorious lawsuit against them just to leverage a
settlement, which could happen more frequently as a result of
the DGCL amendments.
Generally speaking, the board of directors and officers of
a corporation are shielded from personally paying the attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses associated with a shareholder derivative
suit by Director and Officer Insurance (hereinafter D&O
Insurance).191 “D&O insurance policies offer liability cover for
company managers to protect them from claims which may arise
from the decisions and actions taken within the scope of their
regular duties.”192 However, now that Delaware corporations can
no longer implement fee-shifting provisions in their bylaws or
certificates of incorporation in regard to shareholder derivative
suits, no matter what, win or lose, the board of directors and
officers of a corporation are going to be responsible for their own

190 ALLIANZ GLOB. CORP. & SPECIALTY, INTRODUCTION TO D&O INSURANCE 6
(2010),
http://www.agcs.allianz.com/assets/PDFs/risk%20insights/AGCS-DO-infopaper.
pdf [https://perma.cc/36KL-CHSB] (“D&O polic[ies] will pay for defense costs and
financial losses.”).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 4.
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attorneys’ fees, which in turn will create liability for D&O
Insurance providers.
Now, D&O Insurance providers will be “on the hook” for
the attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of their board member
and officer clients every time a shareholder brings a derivative
action. This has two potential consequences: (1) increased rates
among D&O Insurance providers, requiring board members
and officers of Delaware corporations to pay more in order to
stay adequately insured;193 or (2) no change in rates, but
decreased coverage provided to boards of directors and officers
of Delaware corporations, which in turn will require the board
and officers to personally pay to make up for what the
insurance does not cover. In either event, because a board
member may be liable for potentially huge sums of money in
every derivative suit brought against the board, the incentive
to become a board member will decrease.
IV.

SOLUTIONS TO IMPLICATIONS

A.

Relationship Between DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b)
and Section 115

The Delaware Legislature, perhaps in an attempt to put
power back into the hands of the corporation and mitigate the
implications posed by DGCL Sections 102(f) and 109(b), also
enacted DGCL Section 115.194 “The newly enacted . . . [DGCL
§ 115] allow[s] Delaware corporations to include a Delaware
choice of law provision in their certificates of incorporation and
bylaws. However, a Delaware corporation cannot designate a
state other than Delaware as the exclusive forum for an internal
corporate claim.”195 Although Sections 102(f) and 109(b) take
power away from publicly traded companies by limiting what
they can put in their articles of incorporation and bylaws,
Section 115 does, in fact, give power back to corporations by
allowing them to designate where shareholder derivative suits
must be brought. Section 115, however, fails to mitigate the
implications of Sections 102(f) and 109(b) in the form of frivolous
shareholder derivative suits.
Section 115 allows a publicly traded corporation to
implement a forum-selection clause in its bylaws or certificate
of incorporation that prohibits shareholders from bringing
193
194
195

See Geis, supra note 151, at 290–92; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2015).
Boeckman & Graffeo, supra note 6.
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derivative suits in any jurisdiction except Delaware.196 At first
glance, this appears to potentially limit frivolous shareholder
litigation because an exclusive forum-selection clause will force
out-of-state shareholders to travel to Delaware in order to
bring a shareholder derivative suit; however, this reasoning is
flawed. In fact, in shareholder derivative suits, it is the plaintiffshareholders’ attorney who primarily controls all aspects of the
litigation, not the shareholders themselves.197 Theoretically, in
order to circumvent a forum-selection clause, out-of-state
shareholders can simply reach out to Delaware attorneys in
order to bring shareholder derivative suits on their behalf. Since
plaintiff-shareholder attorneys have limited interaction with the
shareholders bringing a derivative suit to begin with,198 the
added burden put on out-of-state shareholders that seek to bring
a frivolous shareholder derivative action is minimal. Therefore,
DGCL Section 115 fails to mitigate the implications, outlined
supra, posed by Sections 102(f) and 109(b).
B.

Proposed DGCL Amendments

Although the Delaware Legislature’s amendments to the
DGCL providing for strict use of the American Rule are a
mistake, it does not necessarily follow that amending the DGCL
to provide for the strict use of the English Rule is correct. While
the American Rule inspires frivolous litigation, the English Rule
may deter meritorious litigation.199 In fact, the deterrence of
meritorious litigation was one of the Delaware State Bar
Association’s main concerns in proposing Sections 102(f) and
109(b).200 It is important to note, however, that no perfect solution
exists to the problems surrounding both the American Rule and
the English Rule—there will always be negative implications with
each. Nevertheless, at least with respect to shareholder derivative
litigation, these implications can be limited by combining both the
American Rule and the English Rule.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017).
Macey & Miller, supra note 38, at 3 (“[P]laintiffs’ . . . derivative attorneys
function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation
risk and exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”).
198 Id. (Plaintiffs’ derivative attorneys “are subject to only minimal monitoring by
their ostensible ‘clients,’ who are either dispersed and disorganized (in the case of class
action litigation) or under the control of hostile forces (in the case of derivative litigation).”).
199 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 45, at 334 (noting that numerous proposals for
a move toward the English Rule have been shot down “by those who argue that a loser-pays
provision would ‘deter middle-income persons from pursuing reasonable claims or defenses,
and place them at an unfair disadvantage in disputes with risk-neutral parties’”).
200 See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 3.
196

197
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Currently, DGCL Section 102(f) states: “The certificate
of incorporation may not contain any provision that would
impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or
expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection
with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this
title.”201 DGCL Section 109(b) reads: “The bylaws may not
contain any provision that would impose liability on a
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation
or any other party in connection with an internal corporate
claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”202 When read carefully,
one notices that Sections 102(f) and 109(b) only prohibit one-way
fee-shifting provisions that would impose liability on the “losing”
plaintiff-shareholders for the “winning” defendant-board of
directors or officers attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.203
In order to effectively address the implications of Sections
102(f) and 109(b), the Delaware Legislature should amend both
sections. These amendments should change both Sections 102(f)
and 109(b) to permit fee-shifting provisions in the articles of
incorporation and bylaws of publicly traded Delaware
corporations, provided that (1) said fee-shifting provision is a
“two-way” fee-shifting provision; and (2) the losing party will not
be required to pay more than 50% of the winning party’s
attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs.204
A redraft of DGCL Section 102(f) could read as follows
(amendments and additions underlined, redactions stricken):
The certificate of incorporation may not contain any a provision that
would impose liability on a stockholder an unsuccessful litigant
regardless of whether said litigant is a stockholder, the corporation,
or any other party, for no more than 50% of the attorneys’ fees, costs,
and expenses of the corporation successful litigant, regardless of
whether said litigant is a stockholder, the corporation, or any other
party, in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in
§ 115 of this title.

Similarly, a redraft of DGCL Section 109(b) could read
as follows (amendments and additions underlined, redactions
stricken):
The bylaws may not contain any a provision that would impose
liability on a stockholder an unsuccessful litigant regardless of
whether said litigant is a stockholder, the corporation, or any other
party, for no more than 50% of the attorneys’ fees, costs, and
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f) (2017).
Id. § 109(b).
203 Id. §§ 102(f), 109(b).
204 For an example of a rule that imposes percentage limits on attorneys’ fees,
see ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b).
201

202
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expenses of the corporation successful litigant, regardless of whether
said litigant is a stockholder, the corporation, or any other party, in
connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of
this title.

These proposed amendments would permit a Delaware
publicly traded corporation to implement fee-shifting provisions,
provided that said provisions are two-way fee-shifting provisions.
Therefore, instead of prohibiting a corporation from implementing
a one-way fee-shifting provision that only establishes liability
upon shareholders if they lose, under the proposed amendments,
a corporation will be permitted to adopt a fee-shifting provision,
but only if such provision is the true English Rule in the sense
that it establishes a “loser pays” rule, regardless of whether that
“loser” is the plaintiff-shareholders or the defendant-board of
directors or officers.
Furthermore, under the proposed amendments, if a
corporation wishes to implement a fee-shifting provision, such
provision must provide that, if the plaintiff-shareholders win,
the defendant-board members or officers cannot be liable for
more than 50% of the shareholders’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and
expenses. Likewise, if the defendant-board members win, then
the plaintiff-shareholders cannot be liable for more than 50% of
the board members’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.
Consequently, these amendments to the DGCL will give some
autonomy back to Delaware corporations, allowing them to
choose between either (1) not implementing a fee-shifting
provision at all and adopting the standard American Rule; or
(2) implementing a fee-shifting provision, but with the risk of
also potentially being liable for up to 50% of the opposing side’s
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.205
As it currently stands, when plaintiff-shareholders
succeed in a shareholder derivative suit, generally their attorneys’
fees are paid out of the corporate recovery or by the corporation
itself.206 With these proposed amendments, however, if a two-way
fee-shifting provision were implemented in a corporation’s
205 It is important to note that the proposed amendments will give a corporation
the ability to enact a two-way fee-shifting provision with liability capped at a maximum of
50%. As such, corporations will maintain the right to cap the liability amount at a
percentage below 50%.
206 Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 600
(2015) (noting that in disclosure-only settlements Delaware Courts require the plaintiff ’ s
attorneys’ fees to be paid by the defendant corporation); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting
Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (“The application of this [corporate benefit] doctrine has led to the
result that in shareholder litigation, the corporate defendant always pays fees and
expenses for both sides.” (emphasis omitted)).
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bylaws or certificate of incorporation, in such a situation only a
maximum of 50% of the plaintiff-shareholders’ attorneys’ fees
could be paid out of the corporate recovery or by the corporation.
This approach expends fewer resources of the corporation, which
benefits the shareholders, due to the fact that, with these
amendments, at most, 50% of the plaintiff-shareholders’
attorneys’ fees will be paid directly by the defendant-board of
directors or officers. As such, only 50% of the attorneys’ fees would
be paid out of the corporate recovery, as opposed to 100% had the
corporation chosen not to implement a fee-shifting provision.
C.

Counter Arguments

The two main concerns that prompted the Delaware
State Bar Association’s proposal to the Delaware Legislature,
encompassed in S.B. 75, was that “open-ended” use of feeshifting provisions “w[ould] curtail the development of the
common law of corporations” and would lead to less shareholder
litigation, and “[t]he absence of stockholder litigation would
eliminate the only extant regulation of substantive corporate
law.”207 This note’s proposed amendments to DGCL Sections
102(f) and 109(b), however, address those concerns; under the
proposed solution, a corporation will not have full reign to
establish whatever type of fee-shifting provision it so desires. If
a corporation wants to implement a fee-shifting provision, it
must be a two-way fee-shifting provision that has a monetary
limit of 50% of the attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.
Moreover, the Delaware State Bar Association argues
that “[t]he fact that stockholder litigation can be detrimental as
well as beneficial should not result in virtually precluding it, as
fee-shifting provisions would.”208 Under the proposed
amendments, however, a two-way fee-shifting provision would
not preclude stockholder litigation—it would force corporations
to choose between either not implementing a fee-shifting
provision at all, or implementing a fee-shifting provision that
puts both the corporation’s board of directors and officers on
the same playing field as the shareholders. Although there
have been concerns that the English Rule deters meritorious
litigation, those same kind of concerns apply to the use of the
American Rule and its incentivizing of frivolous litigation.
While both rules undisputedly have negative consequences, it
should be up to the corporation—whether that be the board of
207
208

See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 4, 6.
See id. at 7.
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directors, shareholders, or both—to decide which rule to
implement. Completely removing this choice from the
corporation and creating a forced adoption of the American
Rule is not the answer to the potential problems posed by the
English Rule.
CONCLUSION
Although when drafting DGCL Sections 102(f) and
109(b) the Delaware Legislature had good intentions of trying
to protect shareholders, it did so at the significant expense of
the corporation, its board of directors and officers, and,
ironically, even the shareholders it set out to protect. In some
situations, it might be critical to choose between protecting
shareholders or protecting directors and officers, however here
is not such an occasion. The possibility exists to protect both
shareholders and directors and officers equally, while also
achieving the goals of the Delaware State Bar Association.209
Therefore, a balancing approach should be used in the drafting of
fee-shifting clauses, and not a blanket prohibition as the
Delaware Legislature has done. Giving autonomy to Delaware
corporations to decide whether to incorporate a fee-shifting
provision into the bylaws or certificate of incorporation, while also
providing two conditions to that provision—the requirement that
the provision provide for two-way fee-shifting and a 50% cap on
attorneys’ fees—strikes the perfect balance between protecting
shareholders and preventing frivolous shareholder litigation.
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